I. Introduction.
Analytical chemistry plays a key role in nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A) . A large part of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) inventories and virtually all of the highly attractive SNM inventories are based on sampling bulk materials followed by destructive assay (DA) of these materials. These measurements support MC&A in process control, physical inventory verification, evaluation of the effects of process changes, detecting and resolving shipper-receiver differences, and the resolution of inspector-facility differences. When evaluating these important functions, US Project Teams need to carefully assess the existing Russian analytical chemistry capabilities and to specify appropriate upgrades where needed.
This evaluation and the specification of upgrades have proven difficult, in part, because of the highly specialized and technical nature of DA and because of the wide variety of methods and applications. In addition, providing a DA capability to a Russian analytical laboratory requires much more than simply supplying new instrumentation. Experience has shown that DA upgrades at Russian analytical facilities require more support equipment than was originally anticipated by US Teams.
Previously there has been no analytical chemistry oversight group to provide guidance to the US Project Teams. An Analytical Working Group 2 (AWG) of experienced analytical chemists from DOE laboratories was assembled under the Material Control and Accountability System Analysis Project (MCASAP) Task. The AWG has prepared this guidance document to offer practical advice and summary information to help US Project Teams evaluate and upgrade Russian site analytical capabilities. Because quality of analytical results is directly related to sample quality, this document also addresses bulk measurements and sampling.
II. Purpose.
The purpose of this guidance document is to:
• Recommend criteria for US Projects Teams to use in their evaluation of Russian DA capabilities.
• Provide a basis for selection of appropriate upgrades where capabilities are inadequate to support MC&A goals.
• Provide a list of DA methods suitable for MC&A with the following information:
⇒ performance and applications information, ⇒ strengths and limitations, ⇒ references and information on cost.
Criteria for evaluating existing capabilities and determining appropriate upgrades are difficult to define. However, this is the basic information needed by the US Project Teams. Section IV addresses these criteria.
III. Scope.
DA involves measurements on samples taken from a larger quantity or batch; typically samples are altered by their preparation such that the sample is not returned to the batch.
This document is limited to analytical methods used to quantify and characterize plutonium (Pu) and enriched uranium (EU). The US DOE and NRC identify these materials as Special Nuclear Materials (SNM).
• Limited guidance is provided on bulk measurements and sampling of bulk materials.
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• All the included methods, alone or in conjunction with other methods, provide analysis of SNM element or isotope quantities and are appropriate for use in support of MC&A. Most of these methods may also provide information useful for process control.
• Some methods listed herein address the determination of impurities present in SNM. These methods are limited to those typically used to measure impurities to provide interference corrections for certain DA methods.
• Appendix A provides summary information on DA methods. General references are listed which provide in-depth information on each method. For reviews of SNM assay (elemental concentration) methods References 1-4 are recommended.
IV. DA Method Evaluation and Selection Criteria.
The primary criterion for evaluating a DA method used in support of MC&A is determining whether or not the method provides the accuracy required to support statements on inventory assurance. Material Control and Accounting goal quantities are defined to determine the appropriate combination of MC&A elements, including DA and non-destructive assay (NDA) measurements, which support statements of allowable inventory difference. The US approach to inventory assurance encourages and supports using highly precise and accurate analytical measurement values in inventory difference calculations. However, because of the size of the Russian nuclear program and the limited US funds, a more practical approach may be needed to determine the best use of the available resources. Each US Project Team should assist the Russians in establishing Material Balance Areas (MBAs). MC&A goal-quantities for those MBAÕs can then be used to evaluate existing analytical capabilities and to determine the upgrades required. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) target values and goal quantities are provided for guidance in Appendix B.
With goal quantities defined, the SNM flow in a specified time period can be estimated, the fraction of that flow which would be determined by analytical chemistry can be estimated, and the acceptable percent uncertainty on the flow for the analytical measurements can be estimated. These estimates allow the precision and accuracy of the analytical measurements required to attain the declared level of assurance to be determined. Note that the performance requirements for DA depend upon the attractiveness of the material. It is absolutely essential that the overall error, which includes the combined errors from every stage of the measurement process, be considered in determining the required precision and accuracy of the analytical method. In general, the precision of the DA method must be higher than that required to simply meet a given level of assurance because errors from other sources, particularly sampling, must be taken into account. A good rule of thumb is that the DA method should contribute no more than 20% to the overall allowable error. Appendix C presents an example of the type of calculation needed to evaluate the limits on DA errors consistent with detecting a goal-quantity loss of SNM from a hypothetical MBA.
A second criterion is technological suitability. All DA methods require some level of technological support, but the requirements vary widely. Readily available electronic and computer support may be needed for some methods together with high purity chemicals and certified reference materials (CRMs). Without these support resources, certain DA methods may be unusable. Each Project Lead must include an estimate of the availability of these resources to evaluate the feasibility of sustaining selected methods at a particular Russian facility.
A third criterion is cost effectiveness. DA methods vary widely in their costs to set up and operate. Sustainability bears consideration as the US support for these methods will be limited, and the Russian MC&A programs will have to bear the operational costs of these methods in the future.
A fourth criterion is the capacity or throughput of each method. Some methods are relatively labor intensive and can only provide a few analyses per day; others are highly automated and can provide many analyses per day. Automation may be desirable not only to increase the sample throughput, but also to reduce variability in the data.
A fifth criterion is training. In general, Russian chemists are knowledgeable and skilled in the methods they employ. However, implementing new or enhanced DA methods at Russian facilities may require training of chemists, technicians and support personnel. Training, not directly related to the US MPC&A program, is also performed at sites in Europe. Discussions with site personnel should be held to identify training requirements and avoid duplication of effort.
V. Sampling and bulk measurements.
The DA of samples alone does not provide a statement of the uncertainty on the SNM inventory for MC&A. The DA of a sample provides the elemental or isotopic information which is multiplied by the mass or volume of the bulk material from which the sample is taken. The calculated SNM mass in the bulk material has an uncertainty which includes uncertainties in the bulk material measurement (mass or volume), the degree to which the sample represents the bulk material, and the quality of the DA measurement.
The capability of the facility to take samples representative of the bulk material must be understood by the Project Team and the facility so that sampling error can be included in the calculation of the overall SNM inventory uncertainty. Failure to collect representative samples from bulk SNM can mask theft or cause false alarms, which undermines the credibility of MC&A systems. Therefore, tasking the facility to evaluate its sampling error contribution to inventory difference is advised to identify inadequacies in sampling practices and to establish the accuracy and precision associated with sampling.
Overall analytical uncertainty depends on both sampling and DA errors. When assessing DA measurement requirements versus assurance goals, the chemist must have a reasonable knowledge of the type and magnitude of the errors from the sample collection process. Since the error from sampling and the DA result on the sample are multiplied by the bulk mass or volume, which is typically a large number, to yield the bulk SNM quantity, the accuracy and precision needed in the measurement of the bulk mass or volume must be carefully considered. The chemist must also know the ability of the laboratory to detect larger than expected sampling errors (by other than the replicate DA measurements). If the laboratory can readily validate a set of replicate samples by a bulk measurement such as sample density measurements (and process tank density measurements, if available), then sample error can be controlled and DA method selection can be based more strictly on measurement uncertainty requirements. To save time and resources, this validation should take place before the DA measurements. If sample validation methodology is not implemented, the reliability requirements for DA measurements must be increased to ensure detection of sample errors from limited data sets on replicate DA measurements. Enhancement of a facilityÕs capabilities for sampling bulk SNM, understanding sampling errors, and measuring bulk volumes or masses to the sufficient level of precision and accuracy may need to be made in parallel with enhancement of DA methods.
VI. Areas of Concern.
While most US Project Teams are at an early stage in assessing the performance of Russian facility DA capabilities, there are already some areas of concern that have been expressed by US Project Team members who have had the opportunity to evaluate their Russian site DA capabilities and to install some upgrades. Several of these areas will prove relevant to most if not all major Russian nuclear facilities.
• The MC&A regulation, ÒTemporary Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Rules for Enterprises and Organizations of Minatorm of Russia,Ó (December 1998, Ref. 5) provides general guidance. However, Russian regulations do not exist which specify goal quantities or performance requirements for DA supporting MC&A. Previously, Russian DA requirements were based on economic or production goals which could be met with less stringent DA performance than that required by MC&A.
• Lack of integration of new DA methods into MC&A Program. The facilities lack operational procedures that have been certified for use for MC&A.
• Lack of MC&A resources. Since the concept of MC&A as a requirement for nuclear material inventories has only recently been introduced in Russia, the staff and funding at Russian facilities to provide MC&A are extremely limited. This situation may limit the ability to implement and sustain upgrades to DA laboratories. DA capabilities provided under this program are to support MC&A. However, it should be noted that because DA data can also be used to support operations there is added incentive for Russian facilities to maintain DA laboratories.
• Limited DA reference materials. In Russia there are no State recognized DA certified reference materials (CRMs) for U and Pu assay or for Pu isotopic measurements. There are State recognized CRMs for U isotopic measurements. Without CRMs the accuracy of DA measurements may not be adequately known.
• Lack of analytical laboratory support infrastructure. Most US DA, methodology assumes a relatively inexpensive, readily available supply of deionized water; high-purity reagents (chemicals); computer hardware and software; environmental control; mechanical and electrical components; direct manufacturer support for installation, trouble shooting and repair; rapid and reliable transportation; and open exchange of and access to information. Some of this infrastructure may not be available or may be too expensive for sustainability at Russian nuclear facilities.
• Use of Russian equipment. There is impetus to purchase Russian equipment when possible for this program. In deciding whether to use Russian or Western equipment, availability, quality and sustainability must be evaluated and decisions made on the basis of which will provide the best long-term solution in Russia. This means the MC&A Program needs to evaluate both the Russian and Western equipment. For high-cost equipment this evaluation is difficult. Mass spectrometry is a good example. At this time there is interest in Russia in producing modern instruments, but the capability is not in place. The concern is that if Russian instruments were to be produced, how could the program evaluate them at reasonable cost? A secondary question is would the program help fund the rejuvenation of the Russian instrument production capability?
• Limits to US funding and the number of technical experts. The number of US analytical laboratories and chemists with specialized SNM analysis knowledge has always been small. With recent downsizing of the DOE weapons production complex, this resource has become even more limited. The US has made the policy decision not to reprocess nuclear reactor fuel; this has resulted in limited spent fuel DA experience in the US. The combination of these factors makes it extremely difficult for US Project Teams to find knowledgeable DA persons available to provide assistance.
• US DOE and NRC MC&A policy. The US has adopted a much stricter MC&A policy than one based on goal-quantity criteria. US nuclear facilities have been allowed and encouraged to use highly precise and accurate DA methods for analysis of SNM for MC&A, while less expensive or sophisticated DA methods may be adequate to meet goal quantities. However, these more precise measurements may be required to detect subtle indicators of diversion, along with actual sampling errors and process upsets.
VII. Discussion and Recommendations.
• Analytical capability must not be confused with equipment upgrades. Equipment is necessary but not sufficient for establishing a capability. Experience has shown that the Russian laboratories neither have nor have access to many of the supplies taken for granted in the US. This ranges from plastic pipette tips to clean reagents. Perhaps the most striking example is the lack of high-purity water. Laboratories also lack climate control. Upgrade plans must take these conditions into consideration.
• Decisions to upgrade capabilities should be made in the context of the overall program and not just in terms of the interests of a particular site team. It is important to have the best analytical capability where there is the greatest need. Now that some experience has been gained with destructive analysis at several sites, decisions on additional upgrades should be made in a coordinated fashion and should utilize the experience gained by US personnel in the earlier upgrades.
• In those facilities where large quantities of SNM are chemically processed, destructive analysis is an important component of a meaningful MPC&A program. In addition to physical protection there is the need to account for the flow of material. Only destructive assay can provide the accuracy needed to do this.
• To date insufficient attention has been given to the question of sustainability of MC&A systems. As part of establishing a new capability or identifying an existing one, consideration must be given to whether the facility has the infrastructure and resources to maintain that capability. This must include the operating environment and access to expendables as well as ability to maintain instrumentation.
• Guidance is needed on the MC&A goals. To date there are no regulations specifying the precision and/or accuracy required of DA measurements in Russian facilities or definitive statements of target quantities for MC&A in Russia. In the absence of Russian regulation or policy, DOE needs to set MC&A goals that it intends to support. Without such guidance it is impossible to develop a coherent program. These goals could be either in terms of targets used by other organizations such as the IAEA or in terms of a ranked priority of sites based on an integrated assessment of the Russian facilities.
• While the US takes an aggressive approach to characterizing special nuclear material, it may be possible to meet MPC&A goals with less precise and less expensive methods. The analytical needs of each MBA should to be evaluated in the context of what analyses, if any, are needed to meet target quantities.
• Training is a vital aspect of capability upgrades. Destructive analysis methods tend to be highly specialized. As such it is important that training be extended to both lead and support scientists and that this training include sessions at both Russian and US facilities. While it is technically possible to provide training only in Russia, this precludes Russian scientists developing an understanding of how analyses are made outside Russia. (If the Russian techniques were adequate, we would not need the upgrades.) They need to see and appreciate the differences between their laboratories and the US ones and get a feeling for such issues as blank control and clean reagents. Limiting US participation in training at Russian laboratories is also counterproductive because expertise frequently lies among several individuals. The lead scientist may understand the principles while the supporting scientists are more likely to know the tricks to make things work.
• The US is not alone in providing training and upgrades to the Russian facilities. To avoid duplication, there needs to be better understanding of these other efforts and coordination with them. This should include efforts to collaborate on multi-use equipment. For example, it may be possible to use a single capability for both MC&A and forensics applications rather than setting up duplicate facilities which will be more difficult to support. Of course in considering such a scenario, one must keep in mind that some operations may be incompatible or require special efforts to avoid cross contamination.
• In order for the Russian facilities to use new capabilities, the methods must be approved and metrologically certified. This includes the development of operating procedures and accumulation of statistical data on method performance. Our understanding of this process needs to be improved. Teams also need to be aware of these requirements so that they can be factored into upgrade decisions. Experience has shown that without this up-front awareness, teams tend to underestimate the true cost of upgrades.
• In some cases there are only a few options for procuring equipment for destructive analysis (and all options are expensive). Mass spectrometry is a good example. Thermal ionization mass spectrometry is the accepted technique for determining uranium and plutonium isotopic ratios. At this time there are only two companies in the world making viable TIMS instruments, both in western Europe. A TIMS instrument installed in Russia costs well over $500K.
• Internationally recognized standards are generally lacking in Russia. In some cases, certified reference materials do not exist Ð international or otherwise. In other cases there are certified materials but they have had little use outside Russia. It is also difficult to import reference materials into Russia. A broader program of standards exchange and inter-comparison needs to be created. This should include provisions for US laboratories to obtain and analyze Russian reference materials. A better understanding of the Russian certification process and their use of reference materials is also needed.
• Analyses are only as good as the samples used. Additional emphasis needs to be put on how processes are being sampled. Specifically tasks should be set up to evaluate sampling at collection points. This should include an understanding of the process being sampled and the way the facility assures samples are representative.
• The Russian and US laboratories appear to approach error analysis differently. This needs to be evaluated in detail. This evaluation should be made by representatives from several laboratories in each country. It is not a site-specific issue.
• Tools should be developed to assist project leaders in evaluating the ability of a site to utilize destructive analysis in its MC&A program. This document is the first tool being developed for this purpose. Generic statements of work should also be considered.
VIII. REFERENCES In this appendix, a list of the more common SNM assay and isotopic ratio methods and some supporting impurity measurement methods are provided. For each method a very concise description of the method, sample size and preparation, support equipment and supplies, calibration and standards, performance, and advantages and disadvantages are given. References are given for comprehensive information on the more complicated methods. Where references are not given use References 3 and 4 on the preceding page.
Cost estimates are based upon implementation of a capability, and include the costs for equipment, instrumentation, training and supplies. Exact costs will be facility specific. To provide rough guidance, the Team has broken the cost into the following categories: LOW = <100K dollars; MEDIUM = 100 to 500K; HIGH = >500K 
ELEMENT DETERMINED U BASIC PRINCIPLE
The method utilizes the measurement of the intensity of the green phosphorescence of U which results from excitation with ultraviolet light from a pulsed nitrogen/dye laser. The phosphorescence of the UO2 +2 is filtered, amplified, and measured by a computer which also calculates the result. To prevent quenching of the phosphorescence, a phosphate-based complexing reagent is added. The kinetic analysis of the uranyl phosphorescence provides a highly precise and accurate measurement, thus, eliminating the need for an internal standard.
TYPICAL RESULTS
Precision of 3% for solutions with 0.001 -5.0 µg U/g solution. -AA: absorption of element-specific wavelengths -ICP-OES: emission of element-specific wavelengths generated by the inductively coupled plasma -ICP-MS: ions generated in an inductively coupled plasma are mass analyzed by one of several methods (e.g., quadrapole or magnetic sector mass spectrometer).
TYPICAL RESULTS Typically, impurities can be determined from 1 Ð 5000 ppm.
SAMPLE SIZE Depends on dilution factor (0.1-g or larger)
. Introduction. The question of how ÒgoodÓ do analytical chemistry measurement need to be to meet safeguards goals can be estimated by evaluating all measurements performed for a material balance area (MBA). To begin this process, one must first establish a goal-quantity for detection of theft. One criteria for making this goal-quantity is the IAEA ÒSignificant QuantityÓ of 8 kg Pu and 25Kg 235 U. These significant quantities are probably for inventory differences (ID) of entire sites and too large for a single MBA in a facility. A more realistic goal-quantity is the US DOE criterion of 2% of the MBA throughput. The most restrictive criteria is that of the US NRC allowable IDs. They are typically <1% of throughput for U and <0.5% for Pu. The NRC levels may be attainable in the US where highly accurate methods are already in place. They are premature for Russian facilities where safeguards resources are limited and there is no history of using such standards.
SAMPLE TYPES Liquids and solids (solids require dissolution).

ADVANTAGES
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Estimation Procedure.
The steps one may follow to estimate the material measurement uncertainties required for theft detection are:
1. Determine the MBAs for the facility. 2. Establish the safeguards goal-quantity for the MBA and the statistical tests and degree of confidence to be associated with the detection of an inventory difference. 3. Determine the inventory period (monthly, bimonthly, etc.) for each MBA. 4. Determine the quantity and type of special nuclear material (SNM) stored in or processed in each MBA. 5. Establish key measurement points (KMP) for each MBA. 6. Identify the destructive analysis (DA) and non-destructive analysis (NDA) measurements to be used for SNM control (or process control or QA) for each MBA. 7. Make a chart or table showing the quantities of SNM, which will be measured at each KMP for each inventory period and the uncertainties, systematic and random, for each measurement method. These uncertainties may be estimated or, in the case of this example, the DA uncertainties left as unknowns to be determined. In addition to measurement errors, uncertainties should include all known sources of variation such as sampling errors, moisture uptake, and temperature and pressure effects. 8. Calculate the measurement uncertainties for each inventory periodÕs SNM flow and beginning and ending inventories. 9. Combine these uncertainties and subtract the combined uncertainties from the total allowable uncertainty for theft detection. The difference will be the uncertainty ÒbudgetedÓ for DA. 10. From this DA uncertainty ÔbudgetÕ, calculate the target uncertainty values for the DA methods.
This process is involved and material flows may not be well known at the beginning or NDA measurement uncertainties may not be well known. However, the factors that do not contribute much to the overall uncertainty can be roughly estimated. If Ôconservative or somewhat overstatedÕ estimates are made for the critical parameters, the final result will be a Ôworst caseÕ estimate. Often such an estimate is adequate for making DA upgrades decisions.
The outcome of such analyses will differ widely with the nature of the MBA and the confidence level desired for the detection of a diversion. For instance the acceptable random error for a measurement will be quite different depending on whether it is a single measurement of a large quantity of material or measurements on a large number of objects. For this appendix, a specific example has been selected and the parameters varied to show their relative effect. The reader is reminded that the following discussion is only an example and should not be considered as typical or representative of a real situation. It is particularly important to note that the statistical treatment used has been simplified. Estimation Example. Consider the case of a MOX reactor fuel production facility that uses low burnup Pu and natural uranium oxides to make fuel pellets. A flow diagram for this facility is shown in Figure 1 .
Figure 1
Step 1: Defining MBAÕs is outside the goal of this exercise. Take them as given in Figure 1 .
Step 2: For this example only MBA-2, where oxide powder is converted to pellets, will be considered. The DOE 2%-of-throughput criterion will be used. Having identified the goal-quantity, one must decide on the statistical tests to be used to identify whether observed IDs are ÒrealÓ. In addition IDs that are less than the goal-quantity, would be used to identify significant problems with the system. Confidence levels for both Òfalse positivesÓ and Òfalse negativesÓ should also be established. These issues are beyond the scope of this appendix. The reader should consult statistical texts such as references 4-6 for more details on this subject. For this exercise, the statistical significance of the uncertainties associated with measurements at the various parts of the process will not be specified. For a real situation, one must make a determination of the desired level of confidence required before identifying an inventory difference as such. To increase confidence that differences are ÒrealÓ, ÒwiderÓ errors would be used. Unfortunately while decreasing the number of Òfalse positivesÓ, this increases the chances of Òfalse negativesÓ; ie, not detecting diversions. In order to detect a goal-quantity ID, the total error ÒbudgetÓ for measurements, including DA, must be less than the goal-quantity. For this example, the error budget will be taken as one half to the goal-quantity The relationships among bias, precision, and number of samples will be illustrated.
Step 3: Accountancy will be monthly.
Step 4: Because the facility uses natural uranium (not an SNM), uranium can be ignored. Only Pu needs to be considered. Assume the Òbeginning inventoryÓ is the same as the ending inventory for the prior month and consists of one input can containing 2 kg of Pu as PuO2 plus one tray of MOX pellets containing 1.9 kg Pu. All scrap is removed from the MBA before the ending inventory, i.e. the MBA is cleaned out between inventories. Assume holdup is measured annually, and does not contribute significantly to a single month ID. Finally assume the end of month inventory is the same as the beginning inventory. During the month the material flowed as follows: ÒNÓ new cans of Pu oxide each containing 2 kg Pu entered the process and the oxide was converted into MOX pellets; N trays of MOX pellets, each containing 1.9 kg Pu, exited the process. The balance of the material (5% or 0.1 kg (Pu)/can) was in the form of scrap powder. Defining throughput as the sum of inputs and outputs from the MBA, the throughput was 2N kg of Pu. Based on the 2% of throughput criteria for a theft-detection goal-quantity, the MBA 2 goal-quantity is 2% of 2N kg Pu. The value of N will be allowed to vary to illustrate the effect of the number of items on permissible uncertainties.
Step 5: Within MBA-2 samples will be taken for assay of both incoming and outgoing material. Figure  2 illustrates this MBAÕs SNM flows and locations of KMPs with their associated measurement methods.
Figure 2, Key Measurement Points in MBA-2
Step 6: The measurements applied to the inventories and material flows are as follows:
The PuO2 can ÒpassportÓ (shipper) values are used until the cans arrive at KMP-1.
Upon receipt at KMP-1, incoming cans are measured by neutron coincidence counting (NCC) and gamma spectroscopy to confirm the passport values The cans are then weighed and sampled. The samples are submitted for Pu assay by DA techniques.
Before leaving the MBA through KMP-2, MOX pellets in trays are weighed and samples taken for DA. Confirmatory measurements by NCC and gamma spectroscopy may also be made.
Scrap; i.e., oxide powder spilled or otherwise not successfully converted to pellets, is collected, weighed, and measured by NCC. This is also done at KMP-2.
Step 7: Table 1 summarizes the quantities of SNM, the measurement methods and systematic (bias) and measurement (random) uncertainties. . Because this exercise is to evaluate the permissible DA uncertainties, approximate weighing and NDA measurement uncertainties have been assigned without further justification. ÒTBDÓ means ÒTo Be Determined.Ó In this example, errors associated with sampling the powder and the pellets may be thought of as included in the errors of the measurement method. In a more realistic case, the sampling errors and statistical methods of sampling should be treated explicitly. Step 8: Calculate the uncertainties for the mass of Pu flowing through MBA-2 over the 1 month period and for the mass of Pu present in the beginning and ending inventory. Tables 2 and 3 show the uncertainties, expressed as Pu mass, for the beginning and ending inventories and monthly throughput, respectively. The exact method for combining uncertainties can be complex. For a first approximation, one can add the systematic errors linearly and the random errors quadratically; ie, use the square root of the sum of the squares of the individual random uncertainties. NCC N x 2 x 0.05 x 0.05 N x 2 x 0.05 x 0.02
Step 9: Combine the uncertainties for the monthly throughput, and the beginning and ending inventories adding the systematic uncertainties directly and the random uncertainties quadratically.
To satisfy the aim of being able to detect the theft of a Ògoal-quantityÓ of material, the overall uncertainty must be less than the goal-quantity. A conservative method for combining the systematic and random errors to obtain the overall uncertainty on the inventory is to add them together linearly. In this example, the resulting equation for the overall uncertainty has 5 unknowns Ð number of cans, bias and precision of both the DA of the powder and the DA of the pellets. To simplify we will combine the DA uncertainties of the powder and pellets and consider only the total DA precision and accuracy budget.
Step 10: One must now determine the target uncertainties for the DA method(s). Given that the equation for the overall uncertainty has three unknowns, it has a family of solutions. An easy way to study the effects of the various variables is to use a spreadsheet to model the behavior. If one fixes the number of cans and assumes the DA uncertainty is dominated by bias, one can set the precision uncertainty to zero and iteratively enter bias values until the calculated uncertainty equals the target value. One can then assume the DA uncertainty is dominated by precision and repeat the exercise. This sets the limits for the set of solutions. Intermediate cases can then be calculated. Finally, the number of cans can be changed and the calculations repeated. Results for several cases are presented in Figure 3 . For a given number of cans, all points lying to the left of the line are combinations of bias and precision that will allow the DA goal to be met.
From Figure 3 one sees that both the precision and bias requirements for the DA analysis become less severe as the number of items (cans in this example) increases. The effect is greater for precision because the chance of the mean being offset by poor precision decreases as the number of measurements increases. (Another advantage of sampling and measuring more frequently is that it reduces the chance of theft from any single item going undetected.) The allowable bias is substantially less than the allowable precision uncertainty. Even for 50 cans the maximum allowable bias is only 0.5%. If the bias is greater than this, it will be impossible to detect the diversion of a goalquantity. This emphasizes the importance of recognized standards in determining bias.
The fact that Russia does not have U or Pu DA reference materials equivalent to the US CRMs should be taken into account in evaluating method biases. Many Russian facilities employ gravimetric methods to assay their Pu and U oxides and metals. These methods, without impurity corrections, will be biased. If impurity corrections are made, the bias may be small. However, without standards bias estimates are subjective.
Figure 3
The fact that the allowed precisions shown in Figure 3 are as high as 6% results from the particular example used. It was not selected to represent a challenging situation and should not be interpreted as implying that precision is generally of little concern. It does illustrate the importance of evaluating the specific situation before committing to upgrades. Evaluations of the need for measurement upgrades, DA or otherwise, should include similar calculations for the MBAs in the specific Russian facility.
Conclusion:
Systematic evaluation of the bias and precision at each measurement point, allows the determination of how ÒgoodÓ a particular measurement needs to be and whether theft-detection at the goal-quantity level can be achieved. Even using estimates of some of the uncertainties, a systematic approach is useful in determining which errors are dominant, how to ÒbudgetÓ the allowable errors, and how to invest wisely to improve accountancy. The 10 step process described and the suggested simplifications and approximations facilitate a simple calculation to make assessments of the adequacy of existing Russian methods or to determine what upgrades would be required to allow the Russian DA to meet theft detection goal quantities. While the example given is hypothetical, it illustrates how one must carefully identify and estimate systematic uncertainties, which may sum to become the dominant source of the overall uncertainty. . 
